ABSTRACT The open nature of radio propagation makes wireless transmissions exposed to unauthorized users and become vulnerable to both the jamming and eavesdropping attacks. In industrial environments, wireless transmissions are also adversely affected by the presence of large-bodied obstructing machinery, metallic friction-induced impairments, and equipment noise. This may result in the failure of wireless transmissions and thus wastes the precious energy resources for industrial wireless sensor networks (IWSNs). This paper is motivated to present a review on the challenges and solutions of improving the physical-layer security and reliability for IWSNs. We first discuss some wireless reliability enhancement techniques for mitigating the background interference, path loss, multipath fading, and link failure. Then, we provide an overview of wireless jamming and eavesdropping attacks along with their countermeasures, where a jammer attempts to emit an interfering radio signal for disrupting the desired communications between a wireless sensor and its sink, while an eavesdropper intends to tap the confidential sensor-sink transmissions. Additionally, we evaluate the tradeoff between the security and reliability, called security-reliability tradeoff, in the context of wireless sensor-sink transmissions. Finally, we discuss a range of open challenges and future trends for IWSNs, including the energy-efficient security and reliability designs, joint jamming-andeavesdropping defense mechanisms, as well as the energy harvesting for IWSNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decades, increasing research efforts have been devoted to industrial wireless sensor networks (IWSNs) [1] , which are capable of providing the remote monitoring and control of factory plants and machines for the sake of reducing potential equipment failures as well as improving the industrial efficiency and productivity. In IWSNs, secure and reliable communications are crucial in the context of industrial applications, where the failure of maintaining data security and reliability may cause an outage of the production line, a damage of the factory machine, or even the loss of workers' lives. For example, if an excessively high temperature (or pressure) of a machine engine is detected by a sensor, an unsuccessful delivery of this critical information prevents an emergency action and thus may result in the damage of an engine. Also, a malicious sensor may fabricate false alarm for the sake of causing an outage of the production line. Hence, it is vitally important to guarantee the security and reliability of data communications in IWSNs.
Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, wireless transmissions from a sensor to its sink are open to unauthorized users in IWSNs, rendering the sensor-sink transmission extremely vulnerable to both the jamming and eavesdropping attacks [2] . More specifically, a malicious node in IWSNs can readily launch a jamming attack by emitting radio signals to interfere with the desired sensor-sink transmission. Furthermore, any network node within the sensor's transmit coverage is capable of overhearing the sensor-sink transmission and may become an eavesdropping attacker. Traditionally, secret key based cryptography has been adopted for protecting the security of the sensor-sink transmissions against eavesdropping. The secret key distribution generally relies upon the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, which is, however, only 'computationally secure' [3] . As an alternative, physical-layer security is now emerging as a promising paradigm to secure the confidentiality of wireless communications by exploiting the radio propagation characteristics [4] . It was proved in [4] that if the wiretap channel from a source node to an eavesdropper is a degraded version of the legitimate main channel from the source to its destination, perfectly secure communications can be achieved in an information-theoretic sense. Hence, an increasing research attention has been devoted to the physical-layer security, which has a great potential in terms of enhancing the security of IWSNs [5] , [6] .
The reliability of wireless sensor-sink transmissions is degraded by both the path loss and multipath fading [7] , [8] .
To be specific, the path loss refers to the energy attenuation of a radio signal propagated from the sensor to its sink, which becomes more substantial upon increasing propagation distance and is affected by many other factors, such as the air humidity and the terrain. Moreover, when a radio signal arrives at the sink, multiple differently delayed components would be received due to the signal reflection and diffraction, which would sometimes add constructively, sometimes destructively. This leads to the fact that the received signal strength fluctuates in time, which is known as multipath fading. Additionally, in industrial environments, the machinery, metallic frictions, engine vibrations, equipment noise as well as the humidity and temperature fluctuations degrade the radio propagation, hence adversely affecting the reliability of the sensor-sink transmissions.
In this paper, we focus on discussing the challenges, vulnerabilities and potential enhancement of wireless security and reliability. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. First, various reliability enhancement techniques are presented for the sake of protecting the sensor-sink transmission against the background interference, path loss, multipath fading, and link failure. Then, wireless security attacks are reviewed along with their countermeasures, including the jamming defense methods as well as the physical-layer security techniques. Additionally, the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) is further examined in the context of wireless sensor-sink transmissions and a range of wireless SRT enhancement techniques are also presented. Finally, we discuss numerous challenging issues that remain open at the time of writing in the field of wireless security and reliability of IWSNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the reliability of wireless communications in the face of interference, path loss and multipath fading, followed by Section III, where wireless security attacks and countermeasures are summarized in the context of IWSNs. Next, we examine the SRT of wireless communications in Section IV, where a security improvement is achieved at the cost of a reliability degradation and vice versa. In Section V, we summarize some open challenges of the wireless security and reliability in IWSNs. Finally, Section VI provides our concluding remarks.
II. WIRELESS RELIABILITY CHALLENGES AND TECHNIQUES
Maintaining highly reliable data communications in IWSNs is crucial in industrial applications, since wireless sensors may generate safety-critical data, which should be transmitted to the sink reliably and timely. The failure of ensuring data reliability may cause an outage of the production line, a damage of the factory machine, or even the loss of workers' lives. The broadcast nature of radio propagation degrades the communications reliability, where any node of the wireless network can generate radio signals to interfere with the desired wireless communications between legitimate users. Additionally, in industrial environments, the obstructing machinery, metallic frictions, engine vibrations, equipment noise as well as the humidity and temperature fluctuations are hostile to the radio propagation and hence adversely affect the reliability of wireless transmissions. The main propagation phenomena degrading the wireless reliability include the interference, path loss and multipath fading, as detailed below.
A. INTERFERENCE
Interference is one of the most severe factors to affecting the wireless reliability, which happens when the transmission of a radio signal generated from a network node is contaminated by another node's radio signals. In IWSNs, there are various sources of interference, imposed by electric motors, inverters, electric switch contacts, ignition systems, voltage regulators, pulses generators, welding apparatus, frequency converters, metallic friction-induced noise, thermal noise, unintentional signals, and so on [9] . These interferences typically have a wide frequency bandwidth and are thus referred to as broadband interferences. By contrast, there also exists narrow-band interferences, which tend to have a narrower frequency bandwidth than the broadband interferences. Potential sources of narrow-band interference include cellular phones, signal generators, local oscillators, microwave and ultrasonic apparatus, etc. The aforementioned interferences may result in the failure of desired communications and force the sender to repeatedly retransmit its data to the intended receiver. This retransmission process not only consumes the precious energy resources, but also imposes undesirable latency for IWSNs.
Channel coding constitutes an effective means of achieving reliable communications in the face of interference, which is achieved by incorporating a certain amount of redundancy into the original data stream for the sake of correcting some erroneous data corrupted during the transmission process. More specifically, when a sensor transmits a bit stream to its sink node in the presence of background interference and noise, some bits may be corrupted and erroneously decoded at the sink. The errors may be classified to burst errors and random errors, where a burst error event represents a contiguous sequence of bits that are received at the sink in error, whereas in the presence of a random error, the erroneous bits received 5314 VOLUME 5, 2017 at the sink tend to be uniformly distributed across the entire bit stream.
Presently, there are some high-performance errorcorrecting codes, such as the turbo codes and low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, which are capable of correcting both the burst and random errors. Both the turbo and LDPC codes nearly approach Shannon's channel capacity, which is a theoretical limit on the code rate at which it is still possible to achieve reliable communications under a specific level of the background interference and noise. These high-performance channel codes have been widely adopted in mobile communications, deep-space communications and other bandwidthconstrained communications systems. A range of specifically designed WSN-oriented coding designs are provided in [10] .
B. PATH LOSS
The path loss models the power attenuation of a radio signal propagating through the space from the transmitter to receiver, which arises due to the following aspects. First, as the radio signal propagates in free space, it has a natural expansion effect, thus resulting in less energy arrived at the receiver. Furthermore, there are certain penetration and absorption losses, when the signal passes through a propagation medium e.g. atmosphere. Moreover, the signal diffraction and reflection caused by an obstacle (e.g., an industrial machine and equipment in IWSNs) will result in power attenuation. Additionally, the path loss would also be affected by the air humidity, terrain, radio frequency, and distance between the transmitter and receiver.
The link budget is generally used for compensating path loss caused by the radio propagation over a wireless channel from the transmitter to receiver. It has to take into account all the channel effects, including the antenna gain as well as the signal attenuation due to the path loss and fading. In the most sophisticated IWSNs, power control is used for adaptively adjusting the transmit power. More specifically, if the transmitter moves away from the receiver, then the transmission distance increases. This results in an increased path loss to be compensated by the power control by using a higher transmit power. Conversely, if the transmitter moves closer to the receiver, a reduced path loss has to be compensated by the power control, leading to a reduction of the transmit power for energy savings.
C. MULTIPATH FADING
The multipath fading refers the distortion of a radio signal resulted from the effect of multipath propagation from the transmitter to receiver. To combat the multipath fading, antenna diversity, also known as spatial diversity, constitutes an effective means of improving the reliability of wireless communications by exploiting multiple antennas at the transmitter and/or receiver. For example, if multiple antennas are employed at the receiver, each antenna will receive a copy of the radio signal from the transmitter. Since the different wireless channels spanning from the transmitter to the receive antennas are spatially separated and experience independent multipath fading processes, the signal copies observed at multiple receive antennas are mutually independent of each other. Hence, it is less likely that all the signal observations at multiple receive antennas are in deep fade. As long as there exits at least one signal observation without experiencing a deep fade, the original transmit signal will be successfully decoded and recovered at the receiver, showing the reliability enhancement by exploiting multiple receive antennas. Similarly, employing multiple antennas at the transmitter is also capable of improving the reliability of wireless communications.
Although antenna diversity enhances the wireless reliability, an industrial sensor is typically constrained in terms of its physical size and deploying many antennas at the size-limited sensor is infeasible. Moreover, in antenna diversity aided systems, each antenna should be equipped with a separate circuit branch, resulting in an increase of the total circuit power consumption upon increasing the number of antennas. However, an industrial sensor is usually powered by a battery and the power resources are limited in IWSNs. Hence, it is not suitable to employ numerous antennas at the sensor, considering its practical constraints in terms of its physical size and power consumption. To this end, cooperative diversity emerges as an alternative means of allowing multiple singleantenna sensors to share their respective antennas for forming a virtual antenna array, which can also improve the wireless reliability and is thus attractive to IWSNs [7] , [8] .
D. LINK FAILURE
In IWSNs, failures of links (also referred to as link failures) are inevitable because of internal and external factors caused by human destruction and unattended deployment. Therefore, it is important to exploit redundancy routing [11] , [12] to provide the communication reliability guarantees form the sensor to the sink. To elaborate a little further, the scheduler may allocate a specific slot for one path from the source to destination. Meanwhile, another dedicated slot would be allocated to deal with retransmission on the same path. Additionally, to ensure the success of the data transmission, a shared slot may be allocated by the scheduler to handle another retransmission on a separate path. In [13] , a redundant cluster-head scheme was employed to enhance the reliability performance for IWSNs. The results demonstrated that the proposed cluster-head routing scheme outperforms the conventional single cluster-head method. Heo et al. [14] proposed a flooding-based routing to achieve multipath diversity, which is adapted to the time-varying network environment. Although the aforementioned routing protocols [11] - [14] are capable of increasing the transmission reliability of IWSNs, it comes at the cost of consuming more processing energy. The design of routing protocols for IWSNs should take into account the constraint on limited power resources of sensor nodes or devices. To this end, energy-aware routing [15] is emerging as an efficient means of prolonging the lifetime of wireless sensor nodes for IWSNs, where the transmission VOLUME 5, 2017 path selection is carried out with the energy consumption consideration.
III. WIRELESS SECURITY ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES
This section is focused on discussing wireless security attacks and their countermeasures in IWSNs. The broadcast nature of radio propagation makes wireless communications extremely vulnerable to both jamming and eavesdropping attacks. For example, in IWSNs, a jamming attacker may emit an interfering radio signal for disrupting the desired communications between a wireless sensor and its sink. Meanwhile, the sensor-sink transmissions may also be overheard by an eavesdropper. In what follows, we first present the family of jamming attacks and their defense mechanisms, followed by a discussion of eavesdropping attacks and countermeasures.
A. JAMMING ATTACKS
Jamming attacks deliberately transmit radio signals for disrupting the desired communications between the sensors and sink in IWSNs. A jammer may either block the transmission or interfere with the reception of the desired communications. More specifically, the jammer may selfishly occupy a wireless channel by continuously transmitting a radio signal over the channel. On the other hand, the jammer may emit an interfering signal only when a legitimate sensor is transmitting to the sink. This aims for corrupting the data reception at the sink. There are several different types of wireless jammers, including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive jammer and adaptive jammer [16] . To be specific, the constant jammer continuously emits a jamming signal over a wireless channel that is shared by all the sensors in an IWSN. By contrast, the intermittent jammer transmits a jamming signal from time to time, which is active for a certain time and then switches to sleeping mode for the remaining time. Moreover, the reactive jammer emits a jamming signal only when an active legitimate transmission is identified. Finally, the adaptive jammer is an intelligent attacker who can adaptively adjust its jamming power to a minimal level required for disrupting the sensor-sink transmission.
In order to protect the sensor-sink transmissions against various jamming attacks, we first have to detect the presence of jammers. Typically, the presence of a jamming signal in IWSNs will result in abnormal changes of the signal reception at the sink in terms of the received signal strength (RSS) and packet error rate (PER) [16] . For example, if there is a jamming signal, the RSS at the sink would increase, thus an unusually high RSS may indicate the presence of a jamming attacker. Meanwhile, given an effective jammer, the sensorsink transmission would be overwhelmed by the jamming signal and a significant amount of data packets are thus decoded unsuccessfully at the sink. This leads to an excessive PER and also indicates the presence of a jammer. Additionally, a 'consistency check' scheme is further proposed for improving the accuracy of jammer detection through a joint use of the RSS and PER measurements, where the presence of a jammer is deemed to be detected when both the RSS and PER are unexpectedly high. Moreover, if a high PER is measured along with a low RSS, this indicates that the sensor-sink channel experiences a deep fade, instead of being jammed.
After detecting the presence of a jamming attack, we have to conceive techniques of protecting the sensor-sink transmission against the jammer. Frequency hopping is an effective anti-jamming paradigm, which operates by changing the carrier frequency of a radio signal to be transmitted with the aid of a pseudo-random sequence that is known to the sink. For example, when the presence of a jammer is detected in a channel over which a sensor and its sink node are communicating, frequency hopping allows the sensor and sink node to switch to another channel for data transmissions. In addition to frequency hopping, direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) technique constitutes another effective means of defending against jamming attacks by spreading a transmit signal over an extremely wide frequency bandwidth. In this way, the transmit signal will have a very low power spectral density (PSD), which may even be below the background interference level. This makes it is difficult for the jammer to distinguish the DSSS modulated signal from the background interference, so that the jammer becomes unable to track and interfere with the sensor-sink transmission.
B. EAVESDROPPING ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss the protection of wireless communications against eavesdropping attacks. As mentioned above, the broadcast nature of radio propagation renders wireless communications vulnerable to eavesdropping. In order to protect the transmission confidentiality, cryptographic techniques have been widely used for preventing an eavesdropper from intercepting the data transmissions in IWSNs. The main cryptographic techniques include symmetric-key cryptography and public-key cryptography. In the symmetric-key encryption, the plain-text to be transmitted is first encrypted by a sensor using a secret key that is pre-shared with the sink. Then, the encrypted plain-text (called cipher-text) is transmitted to the sink, which decrypts its received cipher-text with the aid of the pre-shared secret key. Meanwhile, even if an eavesdropper overhears the ciper-text transmission, it remains unable to recover the plain-text without knowing the secret key. However, the secret key distribution between the sensor and sink is challenging in IWSNs. By contrast, publickey cryptography does not have to distribute secret keys in IWSNs, but it relies upon the hardness of its underlying mathematical problem. The security of public-key cryptography would be significantly compromised, if an efficient method of solving the above-mentioned hard mathematical problem was to be discovered [3] .
As a consequence, the wireless channel based secret key generation is envisioned as an effective means for confidential communications by exploiting the random physical characteristics of radio propagation, including the amplitude and phase information of multipath fading [3] . More specifically, we consider an IWSN system consisting of a sensor communicating with its sink node in the presence of an eavesdropper. The wireless channel between the sensor and sink is assumed to be reciprocal, where the sensor and sink are allowed to directly estimate their interconnected reciprocal channels. Although the interconnected channel is reciprocal, the estimated channel gains may not be identical due to the presence of estimation errors. To this end, an additional agreement approach (e.g. Slepian-Wolf coding) is needed at the sensor and sink for eliminating the difference between the estimated channel gains, which is then used for the secret key generation process. By contrast, an eavesdropper typically lies at another location different from the sensor and sink, and experiences independent channel fading process. Since both the sensor and sink estimate their interconnected channel without exchanging the estimated fading gains over the air, it is impossible for the eavesdropper to duplicate the sensorsink channel.
It has to be pointed out that the physical-layer key generation approach still relies on secret keys for data encryption in order to achieve confidential communications. As an alternative, the information-theoretic security operating without secret keys is considered as a promising paradigm of protecting the wireless confidentiality against eavesdropping. The information-theoretic security concept was conceived by Wyner in [4] for a communications system consisting of a source and a destination in the presence of an eavesdropper. It was shown in [4] that the source and destination can reliably and securely communicate at a non-zero rate, as long as the legitimate channel spanning from the source to destination has a better condition than the wiretap channel from the source to eavesdropper. Later on, the notion of secrecy capacity was introduced in [17] , which is shown as the difference between the capacity of the legitimate channel and that of the wiretap channel. However, the secrecy capacity of wireless communications is degraded due to the multipath fading effect. Therefore, considerable research efforts have been devoted to improving the wireless secrecy capacity against multipath fading by employing the MIMO and cooperative relaying techniques.
Meanwhile, the artificial noise generation is emerging as an effective means of enhancing the wireless secrecy capacity, which enables a sensor to generate a specifically-designed signal (referred to as the artificial noise) for the sake of interfering with an eavesdropper without affecting the desired sink node. In this manner, the wiretap channel spanning from the source to the eavesdropper is severely deteriorated by the artificial noise, while the desired sensor-sink channel remains unchanged. This increases the difference between the capacity of the sensor-sink channel and that of the sensoreavesdropper channel, explicitly showing an increase of the secrecy capacity by exploiting the artificial noise. In the artificial noise aided security enhancement approach, a certain amount of transmit power should be allocated to generate the artificial noise for confusing the eavesdropper. Another effective way of improving the wireless secrecy is to employ beamforming techniques, which allow a sensor to transmit its signal in a particular direction to the desired sink node, so that the sink experiences constructive interference in receiving the sensor's signal, whereas the eavesdropper located at another direction experiences destructive interference. Hence, with the aid of beamforming techniques, the signal strength received at the sink would be significantly higher than that received at the eavesdropper, hence resulting in an improved secrecy capacity.
Additionally, diversity techniques are also capable of improving the wireless physical-layer security against eavesdropping attacks [5] . It is worth mentioning that although both the artificial noise assisted and the beamforming aided security approaches are effective in terms of enhancing the wireless secrecy capacity, they either waste additional power resources for generating the artificial noise or exhibit a high computational complexity for the beamforming design. By contrast, the diversity method is capable of enhancing the wireless security without consuming any additional power resources and without increasing the computational complexity. In IWSNs, the sensors typically have a limited computational capability, implying that diversity assisted security enhancement techniques are more suitable for IWSNs. At the time of writing, the main diversity-assisted security approaches include multiuser diversity, multipleantenna diversity, and cooperative diversity [5] .
IV. SECURITY-RELIABILITY TRADEOFF FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we present the security-reliability tradeoff (SRT) of IWSNs. As mentioned, when a radio signal is transmitted from a sensor to the sink, it will be attenuated by the path loss and multipath fading. If the signal received at the sink is weak and overwhelmed by the background interference, the sink would fail to recover the sensor's original signal, which is referred to as an outage event in the sensor-sink transmission. Increasing the sensor's transmit power enhances the received signal strength of the sink and improves the reliability of the sensor-sink transmission in terms of reducing the probability of occurrence of an outage event (referred to as outage probability). However, this also results in an increase of the received signal strength at an eavesdropper and thus increases the eavesdropper's chance of successfully decoding the sensor's signal, leading to a security degradation of the sensor-sink transmission against eavesdropping. Hence, there exists a tradeoff between the security and reliability in IWSNs [18] - [20] .
More specifically, let us consider that a sensor transmits its signal at the power P and data rate R. Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, the sensor's signal can be received by the sink as well as overheard by the eavesdropper. According to Shannon's coding theorem, if the capacity of the legitimate sensor-sink channel falls below the data rate R, the sink cannot succeed in recovering the sensor's original signal, hence an outage event occurs. Meanwhile, if the eavesdropper's channel capacity is higher than the data rate R, the eavesdropper will be able to successfully decode the sensor's VOLUME 5, 2017 signal and an intercept event occurs. Hence, following [18] , the relationship between the outage probability and intercept probability for the sensor-sink transmission in the presence of an eavesdropper is given by
where λ = σ 2 ss /σ 2 se is the ratio of the average gain of the legitimate sensor-sink channel to that of the sensoreavesdropper channel, which is referred to as sensor-toeavesdropper ratio (SER) throughout this paper. It can be observed from (1) that as the outage probability increases, the intercept probability decreases, and vice versa. This implies that the security improvement of the sensor-sink transmission in terms of reducing the intercept probability can be achieved at the expense of a reliability degradation i.e. an increased outage probability, which again, shows a tradeoff between the security and reliability. One can also see from (1) that the SRT performance has nothing to do with the transmit power P, implying that increasing the transmit power is not beneficial for improving the SRT. To this end, multiple antennas can be invoked for improving both the security and reliability of wireless transmissions. For example, let us consider the multi-antenna aided wireless system of Fig. 1 , where a sensor is transmitting to its sink in the presence of an eavesdropper. In Fig. 1 , multiple receive antennas are employed at the sink, hence multiple signal copies that experience independent fading can be received and combined for the sake of improving the quality of the signal reception at the sink. To be specific, when a sensor transmits its signal, each antenna of the sink can receive the sensor's signal, resulting in multiple signal copies received at the sink. Moreover, a signal copy associated with the highest SNR may be used for decoding the sensor's signal, which, in turn, leads to an improved SRT. In this way, we can obtain the outage probability expression of the sensor-sink transmission relying on multi-antenna reception as where M is the number of receive antennas at the sink, α i = σ 2 si /σ 2 ss , and σ 2 si denotes the average gain of the channel from the source to the sink's receive antenna i. Fig. 2 shows the intercept probability versus outage probability of the multi-antenna reception aided sensor-sink transmission by plotting (2) for different number of receive antennas M . As shown in Fig. 2 , as the number of receive antennas increases from M = 2 to 8, the SRT of the sensorsink transmission is significantly improved in terms of the achievable intercept probability and outage probability. This confirms the SRT benefit of exploiting multiple antennas at the sink in IWSNs. As an alterative, we may also consider the employment of multiple antennas at a sensor for an SRT enhancement of wireless communications. However, in practical IWSNs, it is challenging to accommodate many antennas at an industrial sensor due to its physical size constraint. To alleviate this problem, multiple sensors may collaborate with each other and share their respective antennas in order to form a virtual antenna array for the sake of improving the SRT of the sensor-sink transmissions.
V. OPEN CHALLENGES AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this section, we present some open challenges concerning the security and reliability of IWSNs. Although extensive efforts have been devoted to this research field, there are still numerous issues to be addressed in the future.
A. SECURITY-RELIABILITY DESIGN IN ENERGY-CONSTRAINED IWSNS
The security and reliability of wireless sensor-sink transmissions have been studied extensively in recent years. Also, Zou et al. [18] , Abd El-Malek et al. [19] , and Guanet al. [20] have initiated the research of the securityreliability tradeoff and revealed that an improved wireless security can be achieved at the cost of a reliability degradation and vice versa. In order to improve the wireless security and reliability, various approaches have been proposed, including the artificial noise generation, antenna diversity, cooperative diversity, and so on. The aforementioned methods are indeed capable of enhancing both the security and reliability of wireless communications, but they also exhibit some disadvantages in terms of their increased power consumption and implementation complexity, which may be inappropriate for IWSNs.
To be specific, the artificial noise aided security paradigm consumes additional power for generating artificial noise, which is unattractive for IWSNs, since an industrial sensor is typically powered by a battery and has limited energy resources. Moreover, multiple antennas can be used for improving the wireless security and reliability in the face of multipath fading. However, it may not be feasible to employ many antennas in size-constrained sensors. Although cooperative diversity enables distributed sensors to share their respective antennas, it requires complex synchronization among the different sensors, which may be unaffordable for low-complexity sensors. Therefore, when conducting security-and-reliability designs for IWSNs, it is of high interest to take into account all the practical constraints in terms of the energy efficiency, computational complexity and sensor size, which constitute promising future research directions.
B. JOINT JAMMING-AND-EAVESDROPPING DEFENSE MECHANISMS
Jamming and eavesdropping constitute the main forms of physical-layer attacks in IWSNs, where a jammer attempts to corrupt the sensor-sink connection, whereas an eavesdropper intends to tap the confidential sensor-sink transmission. Spread spectrum techniques (i.e., DSSS and FHSS) are often adopted to defend against a jamming attack, while an eavesdropping attacker may be prevented from having access the information by using classic cryptographic methods and emerging physical-layer security approaches. Existing research has only addressed the jamming and eavesdropping separately, but neglected the joint jamming-andeavesdropping protection. Although a simple combination of the spread spectrum and cryptography is capable of protecting the sensor-sink transmission against both jamming and eavesdropping, it may impose excessive computational complexity and latency.
It will be of particular importance to investigate new mechanisms of jointly defending against jamming and eavesdropping attacks. This new defense mechanism should not only ideally eliminate the interference impact caused by a jammer on the sensor-sink transmission, but also minimize the amount of confidential information tapped by an eavesdropper. An intuitive solution is to use both transmit and receive beamforming [21] , where the transmit beamforming allows a sensor to transmit its signal in the direction of the sink so that the eavesdropper experiences destructive interference in receiving the sensor's signal, while the receive beamforming allows the sink to receive from the direction of the sensor so that the jamming signal experiences destructive interference when arriving at the sink. It would be interesting to quantify the effect of joint transmit-receive beamforming for IWSNs in the face of both jamming and eavesdropping attacks. In addition to the aforementioned beamforming, relay cooperation may also be considered as a means of combating the joint jamming and eavesdropping attack.
C. ENERGY HARVESTING AND WIRELESS POWER TRANSFER FOR IWSNs
In IWSNs, it is hard to replace or recharge the batteries, but this problem may be circumvented by harvesting energy from the environment [22] . If a harvested energy source is permanently available, as exemplified by the vibration-induced kinetic energy of machines, for example, the transceiver can be powered perpetually. Depending on the specific source of the harvested energy, the transceiver may carefully adjust its so-called energy usage policy in order to improve the wireless security and reliability. Energy harvesting has been studied in order to improve the attainable WSN performance under diverse assumptions concerning the energy arrival rates, hence future research will have to be dedicated to eliminating these simplifying assumptions. The research of energy harvesting for IWSNs [23] is very much in its infancy and a whole host of challenging problems has to be solved.
An appealing design alternative is to consider wireless power transfer, which may either rely on electormagnetic induction or with the aid of transmitting microwave frequencies relying on so-called rectennas. Low-power IWSNs dissipating in the milli/micro-Watt-range are becoming a commercial reality. An energy pattern aided simultaneous wireless information and power transfer scheme was proposed in [22] , where the information to be transmitted was embedded into specifically designed energy patterns invoked for wireless power transfer. The achievable rate versus power conversion trade-off bounds were also characterized. The next research challenge is to extend this concept to IWSNs.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have presented an in-depth overview of the challenges and countermeasures of ensuring the physicallayer security and reliability in IWSNs. We have first discussed techniques of improving the wireless physical-layer reliability in the face of interference, path loss, fading and link failure. Next, wireless jammers and eavesdroppers have been reviewed along with their countermeasures for the sake of guaranteeing communications security in IWSNs. We have also discussed the tradeoff between the security and reliability of wireless sensor-sink transmissions, where the security and reliability are, respectively, quantified in terms of the outage probability experienced at the sink and the intercept probability encountered at the eavesdropper. Finally, we have highlighted a range of open challenges and issues in IWSNs, including the energy-efficient security and reliability enhancements, joint jamming-and-eavesdropping protection, as well as the energy harvesting and wireless power transfer for IWSNs. VOLUME 5, 2017 
